q-fixed majority efficiency of committee scoring rules

Clinton Gubong Gassi and Eric Kamwa

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Abstract: This paper introduces the q-fixed majority property for committee selection rules, which extends the traditional fixed majority principle to a flexible framework. We examine conditions under which the committee scoring rules satisfy the q-fixed majority property. Focusing on (weakly) separable rules, we find that the Bloc rule is the only which satisfies it for all q > 1/2. In addition, the q-bottom majority property is introduced, highlighting conditions under which committees can be excluded based on voter consensus.

Keywords: Multiwinner elections; Committee scoring rules; q-fixed majority; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-07
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Published in Operations Research Letters, 2025, 61, pp.107282. ⟨10.1016/j.orl.2025.107282⟩

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Working Paper: q-fixed majority efficiency of committee scoring rules (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04730580

DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2025.107282

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