Social antagonism, identity-driven beliefs, and loss avoidance: Evidence from Guinea

Klarizze Anne Martin Puzon, Ruth Tacneng and Thierno Barry
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Ruth Tacneng: UNILIM - Université de Limoges, LAPE - Laboratoire d'Analyse et de Prospective Economique - GIO - Gouvernance des Institutions et des Organisations - UNILIM - Université de Limoges
Thierno Barry: UNILIM - Université de Limoges, LAPE - Laboratoire d'Analyse et de Prospective Economique - GIO - Gouvernance des Institutions et des Organisations - UNILIM - Université de Limoges

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Abstract: We use a lab-in-the-field experiment to study identity preferences, other-regarding beliefs, and conflict behavior among the Fulani and Malinke in Guinea, Sub-Saharan Africa. In a hawk-dove game, we explore the existence of out-group hostility and ingroup cooperation compared to the baseline where pairs are uninformed of each other's region of origin. We observe that ethnic identity, especially among the Malinke, encourages loss aversion in situations where negative earnings are possible. Identitydriven beliefs, i.e. expectations of others, lead to either reciprocity among homogeneous pairs or materialism in diverse pairs. Using complementary survey data, we also find that high out-group trust and less linguistic diversity are correlated with conflict avoidance.

Date: 2024-10
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Published in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2024, 112, pp.102263. ⟨10.1016/j.socec.2024.102263⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04793120

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102263

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