Comment les entreprises décident-elles d’innover ? L’équilibre entre concurrence et protection de l’innovation

Noémie Mallejac and Marin Lagarde ()
Additional contact information
Marin Lagarde: IDHES - Institutions et Dynamiques Historiques de l'Économie et de la Société - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - UEVE - Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - ENS Paris Saclay - Ecole Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay, ENS Paris Saclay - Ecole Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay, Université Paris-Saclay

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The microeconomic approach to innovation asks how a firm decides whether to innovate, and how it reacts to the strategic behavior of its competitors. A firm innovates if it gains from doing so by collecting a monopoly rent. Economic analysis suggests that a balance between promoting competition and protecting innovation is needed to best foster the dynamics of innovation.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Regards croisés sur l'économie, 2024, 1 (34), pp.23-29. ⟨10.3917/rce.034.0023⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04807962

DOI: 10.3917/rce.034.0023

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().