Fair allocation rules for the commons—informing water policy design through survey methods

Yann Kervinio, Benjamin Ouvrard () and Arnaud Reynaud
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Yann Kervinio: IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, AgroParisTech
Benjamin Ouvrard: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes
Arnaud Reynaud: TSE-R - TSE-R Toulouse School of Economics – Recherche - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: We set up an original framework aiming to produce robust and transferable knowledge on fairness attitudes towards water sharing arrangements. Using a simple axiomatic approach, we demonstrate how different conceptions of common and private property over a natural resource translate into contrasting allocation rules. We then apply this framework to investigate the potential justification of collective arrangements for irrigation water. Using a survey on farmers in South-Western France, we investigate stakeholders' attitudes toward different allocations and their underlying justification. Our results highlight the need to study existing attitudes both at the different level of generality and beyond the opposition between solidarity and responsibility principles. We also observe a strong attachment to historical rights and a rejection of water exchanges, potentially signaling a strong attachment to the status quo or procedural concerns, such as the right to self-organize. Additionally, our results suggest the potential for individual attitudes to change through reasoning or framing. Finally, we discuss how questionnaire studies could provide valuable insights about shared values in a community, and support the design of robust common-pool resource institutions.

Date: 2024-12-02
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2024, ⟨10.1007/s00355-024-01568-5⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04816715

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01568-5

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