An outdated past? Central Bank Independence in the 21st century

Un passé dépassé ? L’indépendance des banques centrales au XXI e siècle

Jérôme Deyris, Gaëtan Le Quang () and Laurence Scialom
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Gaëtan Le Quang: UPN - Université Paris Nanterre, EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Central bank independence (cbi) is based on theoretical foundations that date back to the 1920s. We argue that this institutional arrangement may have lost its relevance in the twenty-first century. Indeed, the increasing interventions of central bankers in the economy diverges from the ideal of neutrality that goes hand in hand with this independence. Compelled to take distributive actions on inequality and climate change, central bankers may well be pushing cbi into crisis.

Date: 2024-11-19
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Published in Revue Française de Socio-Economie, 2024, n° 33 (2), pp.127-147. ⟨10.3917/rfse.033.0127⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04832571

DOI: 10.3917/rfse.033.0127

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