Communication on networks and strong reliability

Marie Laclau, Ludovic Renou and Xavier Venel ()
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Marie Laclau: HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Ludovic Renou: QMUL - Queen Mary University of London
Xavier Venel: LUISS - Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli [Roma]

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Abstract: We consider sender-receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two distant nodes in a communication network. We show that if the network has two disjoint paths of communication between the sender and the receiver, then we can replicate all equilibrium outcomes not only of the direct communication game (i.e., when the sender and the receiver communicate directly with each other) but also of the mediated game (i.e., when the sender and the receiver communicate with the help of a mediator).

Keywords: Cheap talk; direct; mediated; communication; protocol; network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2024, 217, pp.105822. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2024.105822⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04836057

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105822

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