Network Connectivity and Repeated Interactions in an Information Sharing Dilemma

Andrea Guido, Maxime Derex and Rustam Romaniuc
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Andrea Guido: BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)
Maxime Derex: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Rustam Romaniuc: MBS - Montpellier Business School

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Abstract: The sharing of valuable information is at the root of both economic growth and societal welfare. However, individuals and organizations face a social dilemma when deciding whether to share information with others: while sharing can create positive externalities, it may also reduce one's competitive advantage. We present an incentivized game to study the effect of two social factors on individuals' willingness to share information: reputational concerns arising in repeated interactions and the number of social connections. Our results point to limits of repeated interactions as a factor to motivate sharing of valuable information — we find that reputation increases information sharing, but only when the number of connections is low. We discuss some behavioral mechanisms that could drive our results.

Keywords: Cooperation; Social Dilemmas; Reputation; Networks; Information Sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04845024v1
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Published in Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2024, 154, pp.51-76. ⟨10.2307/48777886⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04845024

DOI: 10.2307/48777886

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