A dynamic analysis of criminal networks

Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa () and Agnieszka Rusinowska ()
Additional contact information
Luca Colombo: ESC [Rennes] - ESC Rennes School of Business
Paola Labrecciosa: ESSCA - ESSCA – École supérieure des sciences commerciales d'Angers = ESSCA Business School
Agnieszka Rusinowska: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We take a novel approach based on differential games to the study of criminal networks. We extend the static crime network game (Ballester et al., 2006, 2010) to a dynamic setting where criminal activities negatively impact the accumulation of total wealth in the economy. We derive a Markov Feedback Equilibrium and show that, unlike in the static crime network game, the vector of equilibrium crime rates is not necessarily proportional to the vector of Bonacich centralities. Next, we conduct a comparative dynamic analysis with respect to the network size, the network density, and the marginal expected punishment, finding results in contrast with those arising in the static crime network game. We also shed light on a novel issue in the network theory literature, i.e., the existence of a voracity effect. Finally, we study the problem of identifying the optimal target in the population of criminals when the planner's objective is to minimize aggregate crime at each point in time. Our analysis shows that the key player in the dynamic and the static setting may differ, and that the key player in the dynamic setting may change over time.

Keywords: Differential games; Markov equilibrium; Criminal networks; Bonacich centrality; Key player (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-law, nep-net and nep-ure
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04850675v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2025, 223, pp.105951. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2024.105951⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-04850675v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04850675

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105951

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().