Smart Proofs via Recursive Information Gathering: Decentralized Refereeing by Smart Contracts
Sylvain Carré (),
Franck Gabriel (),
Clément Hongler,
Gustavo Lacerda and
Gloria Capano
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Sylvain Carré: LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Franck Gabriel: LSAF - Laboratoire de Sciences Actuarielle et Financière - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon
Clément Hongler: Département de Mathématiques - EPFL - EPFL - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
Gloria Capano: ISIC - Institut des Sciences et Ingénierie Chimiques - EPFL - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
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Abstract:
We introduce the SPRIG (Smart Proofs via Recursive Information Gathering) protocol. SPRIG allows agents to propose, question, and defend mathematical proofs in a decentralized fashion. A structure of stakes and bounties aims at producing debates in good faith and if those persist, they must go down to machine-level details, where they can be settled automatically. This combination of economic incentives and an oracle is designed to promote succinct and informative proofs. SPRIG can run autonomously as a smart contract on a blockchain platform, and hence it does not rely on a central trusted institution. We translate SPRIG into a general game-theoretic model and prove that the protocol satisfies two desirable properties: no spamming and monotonicity. We then characterize analytically the equilibrium of a simple two-player specification of the model: this provides important insights into the impact of the protocol's parameters on the probabilities that it induces type I/II errors. We conclude by discussing the main attacks SPRIG's designers will need to take into account.
Keywords: Blockchain; Smart contracts applications; Mathematical proof+formalization; Formal verification; Incentivization; Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-03-18
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Published in Distributed Ledger Technologies : research and practice, 2024, 3 (1), pp.1-19. ⟨10.1145/3595298⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04869191
DOI: 10.1145/3595298
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