Vertical relations

Jeanine Miklos-Thal, Patrick Rey and Thibaud Vergé
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Jeanine Miklos-Thal: University of Rochester [USA]
Patrick Rey: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Thibaud Vergé: CREST-LEI, Paris

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Abstract: The paper presents recent advances in the analysis of successive oligopolies characterized by "interlocking relationships", where competing upstream suppliers deal with the same set of competing downstream partners. We first highlight the extent to which interlocking relationships alter competition, and may allow vertical restraints such as Resale Price Maintenance to eliminate it upstream as well as downstream. Modeling difficulties, such as the inexistence or a large multiplicity of equilibria, however arise. After reviewing how similar issues have been successfully addressed in the case of a single supplier, we draw lessons for more general multilateral settings.

Keywords: Vertical relations; Multilateral bargaining; Successive oligopolies; Resale Price Maintenance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07
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Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2010, 28 (4), pp.345-349. ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.02.007⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04888404

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.02.007

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