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Endogenous dynamics of denunciation: Evidence from an inquisitorial trial

José Estévez, Davor Salihović and Stoyan Sgourev
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José Estévez: TKK - TKK Helsinki University of Technology
Davor Salihović: UA - University of Antwerp
Stoyan Sgourev: Métis Lab EM Normandie - EM Normandie - École de Management de Normandie = EM Normandie Business School

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Abstract: We develop an endogenous approach to the practice of denunciation, as an alternative to exogenous historical and sociological accounts. It analyzes denunciation as a response to increasing pressure, which in turn increases pressure on social contacts. The research context is the trial of Waldensians in Giaveno, Italy, in 1335, headed by the inquisitor Alberto de Castellario. A dynamic network actor model attests that coercive pressure not only raises the rate of denunciation but also compels denouncers to implicate individuals who are socially closer to them. We find that coercive pressure starts yielding diminishing returns relatively quickly, with the degree of redundancy of information escalating as a result of preferential attachment, increasingly targeting those already denounced by others, publicly announced suspects, and those having absconded from the trial.

Keywords: Denunciation; Inquisition; Endogenous dynamics; Social control; Social networks; denunciation Inquisition endogenous dynamics social control social networks; denunciation; endogenous dynamics; social control; social networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-09-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04920928v1
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Published in PNAS Nexus, 2024, 3 (9), pp.340. ⟨10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae340⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04920928

DOI: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae340

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