An anti-takeover strategy by limitation of voting rights: A model and a numerical approach

Bruno-Laurent Moschetto and Frédéric Teulon
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Bruno-Laurent Moschetto: CRIISEA - Centre de Recherche sur les Institutions, l'Industrie et les Systèmes Économiques d'Amiens - UR UPJV 3908 - UPJV - Université de Picardie Jules Verne
Frédéric Teulon: IPAG - Institut de Préparation à l'Administration et à la Gestion - IPAG Business School

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Abstract: This study develops a new trade-off view of corporate governance from an examination of rules that limit voting rights as a defensive measure against a hostile takeover attempt. The theoretical framework concerns a listed company, the capital of which is mainly detained by atomistic shareholders and the power of which is in the hands of a minority shareholders, the hard core. The latter wants to block any hostile takeover and constructs a device based on two parameters allowing it to act on the limitation of the voting rights: a threshold and a scale-down coefficient .

Keywords: Anti-takeover amendments; Control-enhancing mechanisms; Corporate governance; Management entrenchment; One-share one-vote principle; Estrategias anti-OPA; Control de la empresa; Gobierno; Enraizamiento de los líderes; Limitación de los derechos de voto; Stratégies anti-OPA; Contrôle de la firme; Gouvernance; Enracinement des dirigeants; Limitation des droits de vote (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-05-04
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Published in Management international = International management = Gestión internacional, 2018, 20 (1), pp.52-66. ⟨10.7202/1045355ar⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04929399

DOI: 10.7202/1045355ar

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