Social Norms Drivers on Public Good Contributions

Lionel Richefort and Pauline Pedehour ()
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Pauline Pedehour: GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement

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Abstract: ABSTRACT This article develops a model of public good provision with social norms determined by network relationships. Individuals' wealth allocation preferences are guided by the benefit they obtain from a private good and a public good, and the social value they receive when following their neighbors in their contribution to the public good. We find conditions under which (i) redistributions of wealth will increase total giving if the transfer goes to the less norm‐conformist agent, (ii) an increase in tastes for conformity of the weak contributors will increase total giving, and (iii) the deletion of a link between two contributors will increase total giving. Subsequently, examples in very small networks allow us to discuss how these results can help policymakers encourage the voluntary provision of public good.

Date: 2025-02-05
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Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2025, 27 (1), ⟨10.1111/jpet.70015⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04930205

DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70015

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