From Cooptation to Violence: Managing Competitive Authoritarian Elections

Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed
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Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse

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Abstract: Autocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence towards voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies? I argue that electoral violence acts as a risk-management strategy in competitive authoritarian elections where: (a) the regime's prospects for coopting local elites, competitors, and voters are weak, and (b) the expected political cost of electoral violence is low. I test these propositions by explaining the subnational distribution of electoral violence during the most violent election in Mubarak's Egypt (1981-2011): the 2005 Parliamentary Election. The results indicate that electoral violence is higher in districts where: the regime has a lower capacity for coopting local elites, it faces competition from ideological (rather than rent-seeking) challengers with no cooptation potential, clientelistic strategies are costlier and less effective, and citizens' capacity for non-electoral mobilization is low. The conclusions provide lessons for containing electoral manipulation and violence in less democratic contexts.

Keywords: Authoritarianism; Elections; Violence; Electoral intimidation; MENA (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Published in Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2025, vol.69 (n°4), ⟨10.1177/00220027241267209⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04938768

DOI: 10.1177/00220027241267209

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