Optimal equilibrium in single-peaked, single-crossing cheap talk games: a dynamic programming approach

Stéphan Sémirat ()
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Stéphan Sémirat: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes

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Abstract: Optimal equilibrium in single-peaked, single-crossing cheap talk games: a dynamic programming approach

Date: 2024-12-16
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Published in Conference in Honor of Françoise Forges, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Dec 2024, Paris, France

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04940943

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