Pandering and pork-barrel politics

Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole
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Eric Maskin: HSE - Vysšaja škola èkonomiki = National Research University Higher School of Economics [Moscow], Harvard University
Jean Tirole: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse

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Abstract: We develop a model of pork-barrel politics in which a government official tries to improve her reelection chances by spending on targeted interest groups. The spending signals that she shares their concerns. We investigate the effect of such pandering on the public deficit. Pandering widens the deficit relative to a non-accountable official (one who does not have to run for reelection) if either the official's overall spending propensity is known, or if it is unknown but the effect of spending on the deficit is opaque to voters. By contrast, an unknown spending propensity may induce the elected official to exhibit fiscal discipline if the deficit is transparent.

Keywords: Accountability; Pandering; Deficit bias; Redistributive politics; Budget caps (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08
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Published in Journal of Public Economics, 2019, 176, pp.79-93. ⟨10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.04.005⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04947240

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.04.005

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