Economic inefficiencies in private management of epidemics spreading between farms

Gaël Thébaud (), César Martinez, Mabell Tidball and Pierre Courtois
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Gaël Thébaud: UMR PHIM - Plant Health Institute of Montpellier - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier
César Martinez: BioSP - Biostatistique et Processus Spatiaux - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier
Mabell Tidball: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier
Pierre Courtois: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier

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Abstract: Most plant disease epidemics spread both within and between farms. However, in the absence of collective action, each farmer generally takes disease control decisions based on personal costs and benefits. It is important to identify under which conditions the combination of such private control decisions can have synergistic or antagonistic effects, and can lead to collective economic inefficiencies. We used the game theory framework to investigate these questions, considering a simplified two-period game where two farmers decide whether or not to control an epidemic on their farm. Taking the example of sharka epidemics, caused by plum pox virus in Prunus orchards, we characterized the game and its outcomes according to initial epidemic conditions and focused on those likely to produce economic inefficiencies. Our results show that depending on the initial infection levels, a broad range of games may arise, some of which involving synergistic or antagonistic control decisions. This means that the nature of strategic interactions between famers may change depending on the state of the epidemic. After a thorough characterization of the epidemic conditions for which private management produces collective economic inefficiencies, we investigated the expected effect of different public policy incentives aiming to reduce such inefficiencies.

Keywords: Epidemiology; Economics; Strategy; Collective action; Plum pox virus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Published in 20es Rencontres de Virologie Végétale, Jan 2025, Aussois, France

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