Corporate governance and financial reporting quality in Morocco: An empirical analysis of conditional conservatism
Gouvernance d'entreprise et qualité du reporting financier au Maroc: une analyse empirique du conservatisme conditionnel
Othman Gaga (),
Said Karam and
Nasredine Fathelkhir
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Othman Gaga: Faculty of Economics and Management of settat, Hassan First University of Settat, Morocco
Said Karam: Faculty of Economics and Management of Settat Hassan First University of Settat
Nasredine Fathelkhir: Faculty of Economics and Management of Settat Hassan First University of Settat
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Abstract:
This study examines the role of financial reporting quality as a corporate governance mechanism in the Moroccan context. Drawing on Shleifer and Vishny's (1997) definition of corporate governance, which emphasizes investor protection, the research focuses on the agency relationship between creditors and firms. In a setting where ownership concentration reduces the traditional conflict between managers and shareholders, creditor protection becomes a key concern. This paper investigates conditional conservatism, particularly the timely recognition of losses, as a mechanism to mitigate information asymmetry and limit opportunistic behavior. Empirically, we test this hypothesis using an econometric model applied to a sample of 38 listed firms over the 2012–2021 period. The results indicate an asymmetric recognition of economic losses, while economic gains are not significantly reflected in accounting earnings. These findings confirm the adoption of a prudence-based accounting approach that aligns with creditor expectations. The study underscores the importance of financial reporting quality in corporate governance in Morocco and opens new avenues for future research on the institutional factors influencing this asymmetry.
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Conditional Conservatism; Financial Reporting Quality; Timely Loss Recognition; Information asymmetry; Gouvernance d’entreprise; Conservatisme conditionnel; Qualité du reporting financier; Reconnaissance opportune des pertes; Asymétrie d’information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-02-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara and nep-cfn
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Published in African Scientific Journal, 2025, 3 (28), pp.652-676. ⟨10.5281/zenodo.14922358⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04968743
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.14922358
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