P2P Music Sharing Networks: Why the Legal Fight Against Copiers May Be Inefficient

Fabrice Rochelandet (fabrice.rochelandet@sorbonne-nouvelle.fr) and Fabrice Le Guel (fabrice.le-guel@universite-paris-saclay.fr)
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Fabrice Rochelandet: IRMÉCCEN - Institut de Recherche Médias, Cultures, Communication et Numérique - Université Sorbonne Nouvelle - Paris 3 - LABEX ICCA - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - Université Sorbonne Nouvelle - Paris 3 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UPCité - Université Paris Cité - Université Sorbonne Paris Nord

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Abstract: The paper investigates empirically the behavior of copiers over P2P networks based on an ordered Logit model of intensity using a dataset collected from more than 2,500 French households. In accordance with the prediction of the Beckerian framework, copying behavior is negatively correlated with the willingness to pay for an original when a copy is available. But individuals also make their decisions according to their social neighborhood and to the degree to which they have learned about copying. Furthermore, we find that copiers are motivated by the search for diversified contents, and they are also very concerned about the interests of artists. We then consider the efficiency of anti-copying policies on the copying of music and movies.

Date: 2005
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Published in Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 2005, 2 (2), pp.69-82

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04991842

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