Anchoring in Takeovers Under Mandatory Bid Rule: Evidence From an Emerging Market

Adrian Pop () and Diana Pop
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Adrian Pop: Faculté de Droit, Economie et Gestion de l’université d’Angers., GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement
Diana Pop: GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement

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Abstract: This article documents the existence of an anchoring bias in the pricing and acceptance of takeover bids in a blockholder regime where the mandatory bid rule applies. Our analysis, performed on the Romanian market for corporate control, shows that the 52‐week high price of the target and the pricing of direct privatisations conducted by the government are strong predictors of both bid premium and outcome. The tender decision depends also on the scope of expropriation perceived by minority shareholders. Our results suggest that stronger capital market discipline is also important for insuring an effective protection of minority shareholders.

Keywords: 52‐week high; acquisition premium; mandatory bid rule; minority shareholder rights; privatisation premium; reference point; tender outcome (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-03-28
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-angers.hal.science/hal-05067197v1
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Published in Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, 2025, ⟨10.1111/ecot.12451⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05067197

DOI: 10.1111/ecot.12451

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