Which liability laws for robots?

Quel droit de la responsabilité pour les robots?

Eric Langlais () and Nanxi Li
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Eric Langlais: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Nanxi Li: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper studies how the combination of product liability law and tort law affects a monopoly's incentives to invest in R and D for developing the autonomy level of AI-based technologies (called "robots") that may cause accidental harm to third-party victims. We assume that the robot has two alternative modes of use : autonomous mode and human-driven mode. Each injurer (manufacturer and human users) must make precautionary efforts, subjected to the legal regime corresponding to the mode of use. We show that the ranking of the different combinations of liability regimes in terms of their effects on the output and autonomy levels, depends on the size of the market; nevertheless, the extensive use of strict liability never dominates.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence; Algorithms; Tort Law; Product Liability; Strict Liability; Negligence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-05
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Published in La Revue Economique, 2025, 76 (1), pp.13-34

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05078273

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