Knowledge withholding by and from leaders: an emerging theoretical model
Nando Strik,
Mien Segers,
Melvyn R.W. Hamstra and
Barry Strauss
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Melvyn R.W. Hamstra: LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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Abstract:
Purpose This study aims to explore the reasons why leaders withhold knowledge by analyzing various types of relational contexts in which knowledge is withheld. Design/methodology/approach This study is a content analysis of the memoirs of five reputed US general and flag officers. After analyzing 1,853 pages, the researchers collected 246 knowledge-withholding units and identified eight relational contexts. They build on interdependence, social identity and social exchange theories to develop an emerging model. Findings The data indicate (a) conflicting interests increase knowledge withholding, particularly among weaker parties; (b) common goals increase knowledge withholding when failure imposes greater risk, and when there is a lack of trust (c) parties may simultaneously experience competing and common goals in which behavior may be driven by their strongest (social) identity. Originality/value The insights indicate that knowledge withholding may be used as an effective leadership tool.
Date: 2025-05-06
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Published in Journal of Knowledge Management, 2025, ⟨10.1108/JKM-06-2024-0690⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05119207
DOI: 10.1108/JKM-06-2024-0690
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