Can framing impact the effectiveness of sanctions?

Agnalys Michaud (), Kate Farrow, David Masclet () and Marc Willinger ()
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Agnalys Michaud: CDSP - Centre de données socio-politiques de Sciences Po (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
David Masclet: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Marc Willinger: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier

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Abstract: Effectiveness of peer punishment under negative framing Conditions that lead social cooperation to succeed, and so a public good to be provided, is still one of the most debated research question. In social interaction, the way others' action is perceived: as a positive or a negative externality; influence the willingness to cooperate (Andreoni, 1995). Moreover, Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Masclet et al. (2003) have shown that expression of disapproval, through the sending of formal and symbolic sanctions, is an effective mechanism to achieve cooperation. The aim of this work is to better understand how perception of others' actions and social pressure interact. In others words, does the framing affect the effectiveness of disapproval mechanism, more precisely of monetary sanctions? We observed through the conducted experiments that the framing affects the effectiveness of disapproval mechanism. Indeed, the introduction of formal sanction, after the subjects experienced a first sequence without it, increases cooperation in both cases. However, the level of public good provided is significantly different. In the positive framing, the introduction of formal sanction lead to a public provision that is nearby the maximum. In negative framing after the introduction of this mechanism the public good provided is maintained around 50% of the maximum. Moreover, the number of sanctions send is slightly higher in negative framing, inducing a cost that is nearby twice the one of positive framing.

Keywords: social cooperation; public good; framing; peer pressure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07-04
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Published in Economic Social Association, Jul 2019, Vancouver (CA), Canada

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05134750

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