An axiomatic characterization of the proportional threshold methods: a geometric approach

Susumu Cato, Stéphane Gonzalez (), Eric Rémila () and Philippe Solal ()
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Susumu Cato: Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo
Stéphane Gonzalez: Université Jean Monnet, GATE Lyon-St-Etienne
Eric Rémila: Université Jean Monnet, GATE Lyon-St-Etienne
Philippe Solal: Université Jean Monnet, GATE Lyon-St-Etienne

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Abstract: This paper considers an electoral system in which voters may approve any subset of options. We introduce the class of proportional threshold methods that select the subset of options whose share of approvals in the population meets or exceeds a certain threshold. We provide an axiomatic characterization of these methods using a principle of consistency between populations and profiles of approval voting ballots. A distinctive feature of our approach is to provide a geometric proof of this characterization result.

Date: 2025-07-26
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, inPress, ⟨10.1007/s00355-025-01618-6⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05200575

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-025-01618-6

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