Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two‐Period Cournot Oligopoly

Sébastien Mitraille () and Michel Moreaux
Additional contact information
Sébastien Mitraille: TBS - Toulouse Business School
Michel Moreaux: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Two‐period Cournot competition between n identical firms producing at constant marginal cost and able to store before selling has pure strategy Nash‐perfect equilibria, in which some firms store to exert endogenously a leadership over rivals. The number of firms storing balances market share gains, obtained by accumulating early the output, with losses in margin resulting from increased sales and higher operation costs. This number and the industry inventories are nonmonotonic in n. Concentration (HHI) and aggregate sales increase due to the strategic use of inventories.

Date: 2013-10-18
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2013, 22 (4), pp.852-874. ⟨10.1111/jems.12031⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05227214

DOI: 10.1111/jems.12031

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().