Nash versus Kant: A game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior

Philippe de Donder (), Humberto Llavador (), Stefan Penczynski (), John E. Roemer and Roberto Vélez-Grajales
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Philippe de Donder: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Humberto Llavador: UPF - Universitat Pompeu Fabra [Barcelona]
Stefan Penczynski: UEA - University of East Anglia [Norwich]
John E. Roemer: Yale University [New Haven]
Roberto Vélez-Grajales: Auteur indépendant

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Abstract: The vaccination game exhibits positive externalities. The standard game-theoretic approach assumes that parents make decisions according to the Nash protocol, which is ndividualistic and non-cooperative. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively, optimizing according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We develop a random utility model of vaccination behavior and prove that the equilibrium coverage rate is larger with the Kant protocol than with the Nash one. Using survey data collected from six countries, we calibrate the parameters of the vaccination game, compute both Nash equilibrium and Kantian equilibrium profiles, and compare them with observed vaccination behavior. We find evidence that parents demonstrate cooperative behavior in all six countries. The study highlights the importance of cooperation in shaping vaccination behavior and underscores the need to consider these factors in public health interventions.

Keywords: Free-rider problem; Measles vaccination; Nash equilibrium; Kantian equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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Published in Journal of Economics, 2025, 145, pp.97-128. ⟨10.1007/s00712-025-00898-x⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05285397

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-025-00898-x

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