The welfare impact of recommendation algorithms

Laura Doval and Alex Smolin
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Laura Doval: Columbia University [New York], CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research

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Abstract: In this letter, we summarize our recent work on the welfare impact of recommendation algorithms and propose questions for further study. We model recommendation algorithms as an information structure, which shapes how a third party takes actions that affect the welfare of different individuals in a population. Each recommendation algorithm thus induces a welfare profile, describing the expected payoffs of different individuals when the third party takes actions following the algorithm. Our framework allows us to characterize and compute the set of all such profiles, which we dub the Bayes welfare set. The Bayes welfare set allows us to reduce society's choice of an algorithm to the choice of a Bayes welfare profile. Our framework complements that of the algorithmic fairness literature which remains agnostic about the population's payoffs, focusing instead on statistical properties of algorithms, such as accuracy, parity, or fairness.

Keywords: Recommendation algorithms; Fairness; Persuasion; Information structures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-03
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Published in ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2025, 22 (2), pp.56-65

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05310934

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