Data Provision to an Informed Seller

Shota Ichihashi and Alex Smolin
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Shota Ichihashi: Queen's University [Kingston, Canada]

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Abstract: A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. A designer can provide the seller with additional information, which the seller uses to price discriminate the buyer. We demonstrate the difficulty of screening the seller's information: When the buyer's value is binary, no combination of buyer surplus and seller profit can be implemented other than those achieved by providing the same information to all seller types. We use the result to characterize the set of implementable welfare outcomes and demonstrate the trade-off between buyer surplus and efficiency.

Date: 2025-10
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, 153, pp.131-144. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.002⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Data provision to an informed seller (2025)
Working Paper: Data Provision to an Informed Seller (2023)
Working Paper: Data Provision to an Informed Seller (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05311012

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.002

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