Gender legislation in France: Empirical evidence from non-compliant firms

Ouidad Yousfi () and Nadia Loukil
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Ouidad Yousfi: UM - Université de Montpellier

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Abstract: This paper studies non-compliant firms with gender legislation and why some businesses are taking the risk of not binding the gender quotas. It is conducted on firms listed on the SBF120 index, after the introduction of the gender law of Copé and Zimmermann, in 2011. Our findings show that gender diversity on advisory committees, unlike monitoring committees, is likely to decrease the non-compliance likelihood. Non-compliant firms have busy members, specifically among men and long-tenured CEOs who are serving in non-dual structures. Regarding women's profiles, non-compliant boards are prone to hire short-tenured and local female candidates. Finally, their financial and social performances are not damaged while their corporate risks are decreased. When penalties are not required against non-compliant firms, refractory businesses do not bear "real" costs.

Date: 2024-11-21
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Published in The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, 2024, 4 (1), pp.214-239. ⟨10.58567/jea04010011⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05322305

DOI: 10.58567/jea04010011

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