The Ownership Structure Influence on the Dividend Distribution Policy: The Case of Listed French Family Firms
Aymen Habib,
Aymen Ajina,
Yosra Meddeb () and
Imene Zarrouki ()
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Yosra Meddeb: ESPI2R - Laboratoire ESPI2R Research in Real Estate [Marseille] - ESPI - Ecole Supérieure des Professions Immobilières
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Abstract:
The usefulness and justification of corporate dividend distribution policies are among the most controversial topics in financial theory. This research aims to shed light on this issue by studying the case of French listed family firms. These companies have a specific governance structure that influences the dividend distribution policy. We examined the impact of the family ownership structure on dividend distribution policy and present empirical study results for a sample of listed French family companies. We explain the dividend distribution policy through the family shareholding structure and the presence of institutional investors and their possible influence. The theoretical framework is the agency relationship. The results show that family ownership positively affects dividend distribution; however, institutional investors have a negative influence.
Keywords: corporate governance; dividend distribution; ownership structure; shareholding family; institutional investors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-08-05
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Published in Journal of Leadership Accountability and Ethics, 2021, 18 (3), ⟨10.33423/jlae.v18i3.4411⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05323926
DOI: 10.33423/jlae.v18i3.4411
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