Preferences for redistributive justice: A participatory-democracy experiment

O. Chanel (), S. Luchini (), M. Teschl and A. Trannoy
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O. Chanel: AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
S. Luchini: CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
M. Teschl: AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales
A. Trannoy: AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales

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Abstract: This paper tests experimentally how preferences for redistribution of members of the general public depend on how money is earned. An experiment was designed to form of "microparticipatory-democracy"where redistribution from winners to losers is decided through a sequential strategy-proof majority voting procedure. Based on five distributive justice theories, we elicit people's preferences for redistribution when their earnings come from four factors: effort, social circumstances, brute luck, and option luck. In the aggregate, our results show that a relative majority of people agree with Dworkin's cut, namely, to compensate for social circumstances and brute luck but not effort and option luck. Participants with bad outcomes are more likely to engage in a self-serving vote, but on average, the dominant concern in voting remains people's fairness view. The knowledge of the distribution of earnings and petition for equality of opportunity make participants vote more in favor of redistribution.

Keywords: Experiment; Responsibility; Equality of opportunity; Micro participatory-democracy; Social justice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08-26
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Published in Journal of Economic Inequality, 2025, 23 (3), pp.717-747. ⟨10.1007/s10888-025-09706-4⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05324740

DOI: 10.1007/s10888-025-09706-4

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