Public Spending
Dépenses publiques
François Facchini ()
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François Facchini: UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - École d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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Abstract:
In the spending ratio, the share of private goods financed from private funds (political spending) is the largest than the share of public goods (Samuelson). Political spending breaks Say's law because they can be consumed with no productive counterpart. The exception made to Say's Law explains why voters demand always more spending, why the politicians use public expenditure to constitute a political clientele and why the legislature uses the constitution to limit the growth of these expenses. It explains also the negative impact of public spending on economic growth via overconsumption, mal consumption and a lot of inactivity effects.
Keywords: Public choice; Public expenditure; BARS curve; Clientelisme; Political Spending; Say Law; Loi de Say; Choix Publics; Dépenses publiques; Clientélisme; Courbe de BARS; Dépenses Politiques (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-09-10
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Published in Richard Jong-A-Pin and Christian Bjørnskov. Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Chapter 94, Edward Elgar Publishing; Edward Elgar, pp.673-679, 2025, 978 1 80220 774 3. ⟨10.4337/9781802207750.00099⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05337009
DOI: 10.4337/9781802207750.00099
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