Incentives and the Economics of Freedom: Slave Peculium, Manumission and Paramone in Ancient Greece
Laurent Gauthier ()
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Laurent Gauthier: CAC-IXXI, Complex Systems Institute, ESPRI - Espace, Pratiques sociales et Images dans les mondes Grec et Romain - ArScAn - Archéologies et Sciences de l'Antiquité - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - UP8 - Université Paris 8 - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - MCC - Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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Abstract:
This paper seeks to explain Greek-specific manumission patterns that economic models have not yet accounted for. According to epigraphic sources, some slaves were able to retain earnings, which potentially allowed them to purchase their freedom (manumission), but in many cases there was a paramone, a duty to remain with the former master, for several years or until the master's death. Manumission prices were also well above recorded slave sale prices. I propose a tractable incentive-theoretic account of these phenomena: income shares serve as effort incentives, manumission prices screen ability, and paramone acts as a credibility device that eliminates the master's financial incentive to unilaterally take all of the slave's savings. Simulations align with basic facts, reproducing high manumission premia and the substantial share of conditional manumissions in the epigraphic record.
Keywords: Ancient Greek slavery; manumission; paramone; principal–agent incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-11-05
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Published in Explorations in Economic History, 2025, 98, pp.101721. ⟨10.1016/j.eeh.2025.101721⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05340938
DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2025.101721
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