 How public debt management impoverishes the state for the benefit of the private sectorComment la gestion de la dette publique appauvrit l’État au profit du secteur privéJérôme Baray ()
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: The article argues that France's public debt is not primarily the result of excessive social spending but of long-term political choices that have made the State dependent on financial markets, creating a massive transfer of wealth to the private sector. Since the 1973 reform – which prohibited direct financing of public deficits by the Banque de France – and later through European treaties, the State has been forced to borrow on financial markets. This shift created a structural dependence on private creditors, reinforced in the 1980s when interest rates exceeded economic growth, generating a snowball effect whereby debt increases even without new deficits. At the same time, privatisations (banks, energy, telecoms, motorways, airports) deprived the State of stable long-term revenues, while public subsidies to firms have multiplied (210 billion euros in 2023) without strong conditionality. Combined, these choices have weakened the State financially, while interest payments (55–68 billion euros per year) mainly benefit banks, investment funds, insurance companies, and holders of government bonds. This system creates a financial rent, sustained by forms of collusion between top civil servants, major corporations, and the financial sector—what Pierre Bourdieu called the "State nobility." The article also shows how debt has become a tool of governance: budgetary constraints and technocratic indicators turn political decisions into supposedly objective necessities. This dynamic aligns with the "society of control" described by Foucault and Deleuze, where austerity and digital surveillance shape citizens' behaviours and reduce the space for political debate. The article proposes several credible alternatives: - State borrowing at zero interest, as before 1973; - strict conditionality for corporate subsidies; - tax reform targeting rents and closing loopholes; - strong antitrust laws to counter excessive market concentration; - a social contribution on artificial intelligence to share productivity gains; - administrative simplification to free up budgetary margins. The conclusion emphasises that public debt is not the result of collective irresponsibility but of a political and economic system oriented toward financialisation. Regaining control over debt means regaining control over money, sovereignty, and collective priorities, and recognising that economic policy is a matter of political choice—not technical inevitability. Keywords: austerity; financialisation; financial markets; interest rates; privatisations; corporate subsidies; financial rent; collusion; monetary sovereignty; money creation; economic governance; surveillance; public policy; the State; wealth transfer; banks; investment funds; inequalities; economic alternatives; public debt; souveraineté monétaire; dette publique; financiarisation; marchés financiers; taux d’intérêt; aides publiques aux entreprises; rente financière; connivence; création monétaire; austérité; gouvernance économique; politiques publiques; État; transfert de richesses; banques; fonds d’investissement; inégalités; alternatives économiques (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in The Conversation France, 2025, ⟨10.64628/AAK.59xknt77e⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05363810 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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