Rationality and Coordination of Financial Markets Vs. Stability of Global Financial System

Rationalité et coordination sur les marchés financiers Vs. Stabilité financière internationale

Claire Barraud ()
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Claire Barraud: UGA UFR FEG - Université Grenoble Alpes - Faculté d'Économie de Grenoble - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019]

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Abstract: This paper shows how the contributions of Behavioral Finance and the Economics of Conventions make it possible to reconsider the triggering factors in a sovereign debt crisis. We start from the premise that the volatility of financial prices is not a mere anomaly, but rather a recurrent and often significant phenomenon, including in the sovereign debt market. Consequently, we establish a dual responsibility in the onset of sovereign debt crises. Alongside that of debtor states, which is widely mentioned and documented, lies the responsibility of financial markets, whose mimetic rationality distances them from efficiency. As a result, any debt-restructuring mechanism should involve a third party to arbitrate the adjustment burden of the balance of payments, which currently falls solely on the debtor.

Keywords: Sovereign debt restructuring; Sovereign debt crises; Behavioral finance; Convention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-07-02
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Published in 6th International Conference Developments in economic theory and policy, University of Bilbao, Jul 2009, Bilbao, Spain

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05396178

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