Conservation auctions: an online double constraint reverse auction experiment

Adrien Coiffard (), Raphaële Préget () and Mabel Tidball ()
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Adrien Coiffard: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier
Raphaële Préget: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier
Mabel Tidball: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier

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Abstract: Conservation auctions are designed to allocate payments for environmental services to voluntary farmers. The auctioneer may announce either the maximum number of contracts (target-constrained auction) or, more commonly, the total budget available (budget-constrained auction). Building on Coiffard et al. (2025), who compared these two formats, we introduce a new double-constraint auction, where both constraints — set at the same levels as in the benchmarks — are simultaneously disclosed to participants. Using the same experimental methodology, we assess performance consistent with a generic policy objective: maximizing environmental benefits while minimizing expenditures. On average, the double-constraint auction outperforms both target- and budget-constrained formats.

Keywords: Reverse auctions; Conservation auctions; Double constraint; Payment for environmental services (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Published in European Review of Agricultural Economics, inPress, CEE-M Working papers ; 2023-08, 29 p

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05403919

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