An Economic Theory of Populism: Political Disequilibrium and Democratic Instability

Une théorie économique du populisme: déséquilibre politique et instabilité démocratique

Alexandre Chirat () and Cyril Hédoin ()
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Alexandre Chirat: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
Cyril Hédoin: REGARDS - Recherches en Économie Gestion AgroRessources Durabilité Santé- EA 6292 - URCA - Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne - MSH-URCA - Maison des Sciences Humaines de Champagne-Ardenne - URCA - Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, CRIEG - Centre de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Economie Gestion - MSH-URCA - Maison des Sciences Humaines de Champagne-Ardenne - URCA - Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne

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Abstract: This paper deduces conditions under which populism successfully emerges in democratic contexts. Building on Downs's economic theory of democracy, it hinges on three assumptions: uncertainty, rationality, and democratic stability. This theory considers three main types of agents: citizens, political parties, and information providers. We demonstrate that the necessary and sufficient conditions for a populist party to emerge and gain significant electoral support are 1) a political disequilibrium between demand (citizens' preferences) and supply (parties' platforms) combined with 2) democratic instability due to ideological polarization. Such conditions provide the rationale behind populist anti-elitism and its thin nature as an ideology. Since this paper provides a theoretical account of populism that, while sharing Downsian roots, differs from main political economy models of populism, we provide a systematic comparison. In particular, we show that the conditions under which the Median Voter Theorem is relevant are at odds with the conditions required to account for populism.

Keywords: Populism; -Uncertainty; -Rationality; -Public; interest; -democratic; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-11-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2025, 135 (5), pp.735-762

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05414427

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