Political competition and representation in municipal councils

Christophe Lévêque
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Christophe Lévêque: BSE - Bordeaux sciences économiques - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: I study whether the numbers of high- and low-social status-individuals in French municipal councils are affected by the level of political competition. I argue that because the most-eligible positions within lists of candidates are obtained by high-social-status persons, political competition increases the number of high-status municipal councilors and is thus detrimental to the election of low-social-status candidates. Using the elections of 2008 and 2014, I provide suggestive evidence that the socioeconomic status of individuals is indeed correlated with their position within lists of candidates. Moreover, I show that the presence of an additional competing list during an election is associated with 0.2 additional high-social-status individuals within the municipal councils. I also observe that those additional municipal councilors are males, which is a result that might have been caused by the gender quota policy implemented in French local elections.

Keywords: Municipal council; Socioeconomic background; Representation; French municipal election; Political competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05-07
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Published in Local Government Studies, 2024, 51 (2), pp.229-260. ⟨10.1080/03003930.2024.2350627⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05461142

DOI: 10.1080/03003930.2024.2350627

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