Governance, Productivity and Economic Development
Cuong Le Van,
Ngoc‐Sang Pham,
Thi Kim Cuong Pham () and
Binh Tran-Nam
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Cuong Le Van: CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, DEPOCEN - Development and Policies Research Center, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris
Ngoc‐Sang Pham: Métis Lab EM Normandie - EM Normandie - École de Management de Normandie = EM Normandie Business School
Thi Kim Cuong Pham: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, FERDI - Fondation pour les Etudes et Recherches sur le Développement International, VNU-UEB - VNU University of Economics and Business–Vietnam National University, Hanoi
Binh Tran-Nam: RMIT - School of Business and Management, RMIT University Vietnam, DEPOCEN - Development and Policies Research Center
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Abstract:
ABSTRACT This paper explores the interplay between transfer policies, R&D, corruption, and economic development using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and a government. The government collects taxes, redistributes fiscal revenues, and undertakes public investment (in R&D, infrastructure, etc.). Corruption is modeled as a fraction of tax revenues that is siphoned off and removed from the economy. We first establish the existence of a political‐economic equilibrium. Then, using an analytically tractable framework with two private agents, we examine the effects of corruption and evaluate the impact of various policies, including redistribution and innovation‐led strategies.
Date: 2026-01-13
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Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2026, 28 (1), ⟨10.1111/jpet.70099⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05469587
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70099
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