The consequences of a third party decision on coopetition strategies: the case of the international accounting standard-setting process

Francoise Pierrot () and Anne-Sophie Fernandez ()
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Francoise Pierrot: MRM - Montpellier Research in Management - UPVD - Université de Perpignan Via Domitia - UM - Université de Montpellier, UM - Université de Montpellier
Anne-Sophie Fernandez: UM - Université de Montpellier

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Abstract: Coopetition is a paradoxical strategy combining simultaneously cooperation and competition. Previous scholars investigated the role of the third-party in coopetition dynamics: it can initiate and drive the coopetition strategy or it can be involved in the management of the relationship. But the consequences of this involvement remain under-investigated. This research aims to fill this gap: what are the consequences of the involvement of a third-party in a coopetition strategy on the partners and their relationship? To answer this question, we conducted a longitudinal case study of coopetition strategies between two institutions the FASB and the IASB in the specific context of the global accounting standard-setting process and convergence process between the US GAAPs and the IFRSs.Our findings enable us to identify three different phases in the process. We provide evidence on the role of the third-party (the European Union in the case) in the evolution of the coopetition dynamic between the FASB and the IASB, and analyze the consequences on both partners and their relationship.

Date: 2016
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Published in International Journal of Standardization Research, 2016, 14 (2), pp.19

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05473828

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