GPs’ willingness to delegate tasks: may financial incentives balance risk aversion?

Simon Combes, Alain Paraponaris () and Yann Videau ()
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Alain Paraponaris: AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Date: 2025-07-04
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Published in Journal de gestion et d'économie de la santé, 2025, N° 1 (1), pp.43-64. ⟨10.54695/jdds.043.1.0043⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05482013

DOI: 10.54695/jdds.043.1.0043

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