Why should I comply with taxes if others don’t? Social information and behavioral convergence: An experimental study

Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, Marisa Ratto and Emmanuelle Taugourdeau
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Nathalie Etchart-Vincent: GRID - Groupe de Recherche sur le risque, l'Information et la Décision - ENS Cachan - École normale supérieure - Cachan - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Marisa Ratto: LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Emmanuelle Taugourdeau: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - Groupe ENSAE-ENSAI - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - Groupe ENSAE-ENSAI - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This experimental study investigates the impact of social information about others' tax behavior on individuals'subsequent tax decisions. Two types of social information are introduced: (i) the average income reportedwithin the subject's entire group, and (ii) the average income reported within a reference subgroup made ofeither peers or non-peers and chosen by the subject. Our results show that social information significantlyaffects subsequent tax decisions, with a change in reported income ranging from 15% to 30% of total incomeon average. Moreover, the influence of whole-group information on tax behavior appears to be stronger thanthat of chosen-group information. Quite strikingly, a majority of subjects show more interest in the tax behaviorof non-peers than in that of peers. Finally, our data provide strong evidence of behavioral convergence towardsthe average tax behavior of others.

Keywords: Artefactual field experiment; Tax morale; Behavioral convergence; Social information; Tax compliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-01
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Published in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2026, 120

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05483699

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