Default energy sharing rule: The case of France
Julien Jacqmin,
Marco Gazel and
Isac Olave-Cruz ()
Additional contact information
Julien Jacqmin: NEOMA - Neoma Business School
Marco Gazel: NEOMA - Neoma Business School
Isac Olave-Cruz: LERN - Laboratoire d'Economie Rouen Normandie - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - IRIHS - Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Homme et Société - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université
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Abstract:
This policy perspective critically examines the French regulatory framework that governs collective self-consumption of electricity. Under the French Energy Code, energy sharing is subject to a dynamic pro rata to consumption rule by default. We demonstrate how behavioral biases and governance structures lead members to stick to this default. Furthermore, our analysis highlights several shortcomings within this regulatory framework. First, it can create inequitable distributions when members have different consumption profiles or flexibility. Second, it may generate price signals with counterproductive effects, even if the community setting brings some new scrutiny to individual actions. Finally, this centralized approach fundamentally contradicts the decentralized ethos that underpins these initiatives. By highlighting these limitations, we aim to improve the current regulations to boost the development of collective self-consumption and better inform their members before deciding which energy sharing rule to pick.
Keywords: Sharing rule; Collective self-consumption; Renewable energy communities; Energy sharing; Default (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04
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Published in Energy Policy, 2026, 211, pp.115074. ⟨10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115074⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05500048
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115074
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