Detection Avoidance and Deterrence: Some Paradoxical Arithmetic

Eric Langlais ()
Additional contact information
Eric Langlais: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Abstract This paper extends Malik's analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public expenditures in the detection of criminals are strategic complements in the aggregate technology of control of illegal behaviors. In this set up, we show that whenever criminals' avoidance efforts are more sensitive to the frequency than to the severity of sanctions, it is always socially efficient to set the fine at the maximal possible level. However, several paradoxical consequences occur: there may exist overdeterrence at optimum; more repressive policies lead to fewer arrests of offenders while more crimes may be committed; at the same time, the society may be closer to the first best number of crimes.

Date: 2008-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008, 10 (3), pp.371-382. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00367.x⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05510751

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00367.x

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().