Les effets d'anti-sélection lorsque le Principal et les Agents ont des croyances différentes: une illustration dans le cas du marché du crédit

Eric Langlais ()
Additional contact information
Eric Langlais: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Date: 1999-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Revue d'économie politique, 1999, 109 (4, juillet-août), pp.513-533

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05511025

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().