Water sharing and equity-efficiency trade-offs: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in India

Benjamin Ouvrard (), Arnaud Reynaud, Stéphane Cezera, Alban Thomas, Dishant Jojit James and Murudaiah Shivamurthy
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Benjamin Ouvrard: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes, TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Arnaud Reynaud: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Stéphane Cezera: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Alban Thomas: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes
Dishant Jojit James: Wyzsza Szkola Bankowa University
Murudaiah Shivamurthy: UAS - University of Agricultural Sciences, Bangalore

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Abstract: We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment to analyze the preferences of Indian farmers (Karnataka state) regarding surface water sharing. To elicit impartial social preferences, we implement a dictator game behind the veil of ignorance in which a limited quantity of water has to be allocated between two farmers which differ in terms of location (upstream versus downstream) and water productivity. We first show that subjects express preferences for allocating less water to the downstream farmer. Next, we demonstrate that a majority of subjects' decisions are consistent with efficient, egalitarian in payoff or egalitarian in quantity behaviors. Last, more efficient water allocation behaviors can be induced by modifying subjects' choice architecture. For instance, a loss framing is shown to induce subjects to share more efficiently the water resource, but only when the most productive farmer is located downstream.

Keywords: India; Water sharing; Framing; Veil of ignorance; Lab-in-the-field experiment; Dictator game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08
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Published in Resource and Energy Economics, 2025, 83, pp.101510. ⟨10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101510⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05513332

DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2025.101510

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