Managerial myopia and capital structure in China

Zhaobo Zhu (), Jiaxin Chang and Yolanda Yulong Wang ()
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Zhaobo Zhu: Audencia Business School
Yolanda Yulong Wang: Audencia Business School

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Abstract: This paper examines how managerial myopia affects capital structure decisions of publicly traded firms in China. We find a significantly (insignificantly) positive relation between managerial myopia and total and long-term (short-term) debt levels. The positive relation between myopia and corporate leverage is more pronounced for firms with relatively low cost of debt. Efficient corporate governance seems to mitigate the overuse of debt financing for myopic managers. Time-varying market uncertainty and conditions affect the relation between managerial myopia and corporate leverage. Our findings seem consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure to some extent. Our study provides important implications for China's corporate debt crisis and default resolution in China.

Keywords: Managerial myopia; Capital structure; Corporate debt; Leverage; Financing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05521431v1
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Published in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2026, 66 (2), pp.635-658. ⟨10.1007/s11156-025-01410-8⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05521431

DOI: 10.1007/s11156-025-01410-8

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