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Contract preference of an online intermediary in the presence of online reviews and cross-channel spillover

Yang Tong, Yina Li, Fei Ye, Ajay Kumar () and Kim Hua Tan
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Yang Tong: Zhejiang Normal University
Yina Li: SCUT - South China University of Technology [Guangzhou]
Fei Ye: SCUT - South China University of Technology [Guangzhou]
Ajay Kumar: EM - EMLyon Business School
Kim Hua Tan: UON - University of Nottingham, UK

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Abstract: In e-commerce, online intermediaries give suppliers ready access to consumers and have thereby become an important distribution channel. They can operate as resellers (under a reselling contract) or marketplaces (under an agency contract) for suppliers. This study analyzes the most effective contract arrangement between an online intermediary and two competing suppliers. The suppliers receive online reviews of their products and also be affected by the spillover effect of the intermediary's channel on their own direct sales channels. The intermediary can offer a reselling contract to one supplier and an agency contract to the other or offer the same contract type to both suppliers. We find that when the cross-channel spillover is positive or only moderately negative, the intermediary offers different contract types if the difference in the review ratings of the two suppliers' products is considerable; otherwise, a reselling contract is offered to both. However, when the cross-channel spillover is highly negative, the intermediary may offer an agency contract to both suppliers. Our research provides practical guidance for intermediaries on the most effective contract strategies to use when collaborating with suppliers who receive varied online reviews, depending on the cross-channel spillover scenarios.

Keywords: cross-channel spillover; e-commerce; supply chain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12-01
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Published in Managerial and Decision Economics, 2024, 45 (8), pp.5867 - 5882. ⟨10.1002/mde.4320⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05531901

DOI: 10.1002/mde.4320

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