Risque, diversité bancaire et réglementation optimale

Noëlle Bonnet
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Noëlle Bonnet: GRIEF - Groupe de recherches sur l'intégration économique et financière

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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to define bank regulation when the regulator objective is to guarantee the financial sector stability. We assume the risk level of banks unknown. We work with Principal-Agent models in order to integrate revelation principles. Banks are thus induce to announce their risk level, which will allow the regulator to define an appropriate capital level. This model demonstrate that to each risk level, must be joint a solvency ratio, but also that it must be validated by a notation agency. The use of interns models, allowed by prudential regulation, must be attested by a risk indicator.

Date: 1998
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Published in Revue Française d'Economie, 1998, Firme bancaire, 13 (2), pp.311-341. ⟨10.3406/rfeco.1998.1059⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05550026

DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.1998.1059

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