Priming ideology II: presidential elections increasingly affect U.S. judges
Daniel L. Chen
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Daniel L. Chen: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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Abstract:
This paper develops a theoretical model of salience of partisan identities during presidential elections affecting U.S. judges. Electoral cycles in judicial dissents are larger in close elections, non-existent in landslide elections, and reversed in wartime elections. Dissents are elevated for judges in states with a close popular vote when that state has more electoral votes. U.S. Senator elections, whose timing also varies by state, also elevate dissents. Dissents before elections appear on more marginal cases that cite discretionary miscellaneous issues and procedural rather than substantive arguments. The Supreme Court appears to recognize and only partly remedy the behavioral anomalies. Electoral cycles have been growing over time, which points to a more politically charged and polarized judiciary.
Keywords: Identity; Salience; Judicial decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08
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Published in European Journal of Law and Economics, 2025, 60 (1), pp.1-32. ⟨10.1007/s10657-025-09842-2⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05556156
DOI: 10.1007/s10657-025-09842-2
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